Why 2009 Isn't 2006

Making predictions about the Middle East is not easy. And I'm not about to predict an Israeli success in Gaza. There are far too many variables at play. But there are a few points worth consideration as to why Israel may be more successful in Gaza than it was in Lebanon in 2006.

The Lebanese people are seen largely as a third party drug into the Palestinian problems by various state and non-state actors, including Israel. In that sense it's easier to view the people of Lebanon as innocent bystanders than it is the people of Gaza.

Hamas benefited from the experience of Hezbollah in 2006. Hamas expected to repeat that history in Gaza in the event of an Israeli ground attack. But the Israelis also learned a few lessons in southern Lebanon in 2006 and, I assume, are conducting their operations in Gaza along different lines. Hamas may well have fallen victim to the "preparing for the last war" syndrome.

Mumbai! Not that there's any link between the Mumbai jihadists and Hamas, but the images of Mumbai are fresh in people's minds, and such memories of Islamist terror can do little to gain Hamas more sympathy.

Iraq! In 2006, pre-surge, the war in Iraq was going poorly. That realization only reinforced the idea that military action was pointless in the face of Islamist resistance. Post-surge, military actions does not appear hopeless. Quite the contrary, as even President-Elect Obama has recognized, as he prepares to "surge" in Afghanistan.

I'd also add that the Arab states are more amenable to seeing Hamas weakened or destroyed than they were Hezbollah. The Arabs support Fatah, which is more threatened by Hamas than by Israel. To be sure the Arab states also dislike Hezbollah, but the alternative to Hezbollah in Lebanon isn't Fatah, but a dangerous popular democracy.

Taken together these factors may mean that the IDF-Hamas confrontation on the ground will go better for Israel, while in the international arena the Israelis may have more time to operate.